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STRANDED AGAIN: THE INADEQUACY OF 
FEDERAL PLANS TO REBUILD AN 
AFFORDABLE NEW ORLEANS AFTER 
HURRICANE KATRINA 
Larkin M. Moore*
Abstract: Hurricane Katrina was the most devastating hurricane to hit the 
United States in recorded history. The damage in New Orleans was most 
acutely felt by poor and African-American neighborhoods. One of the 
most pressing issues for poor residents of New Orleans in the future will 
be the availability of affordable housing. After the hurricane, Rep. Rich-
ard H. Baker (R-La.) proposed that the legislature create a government-
run corporation with the mission of facilitating the rebuilding of Louisi-
ana communities. His plan took into account community needs and pri-
oritized affordable housing and well-planned development. Baker’s Bill 
has been rejected by the Bush Administration, which favors a free-market 
solution enhanced with federal tax incentives for developers and busi-
ness. During the last session of Congress, Baker‘s Bill never became law. 
Looking back at previous disasters and forward to new visions of the city, 
this Note concludes that Baker’s proposal should be reintroduced and 
the House and Senate should adopt the Baker Bill as soon as possible to 
provide an innovative plan for rebuilding New Orleans. 
Introduction 
 On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall in New Or-
leans, Louisiana.1 The power of the Category Five hurricane ºattened 
homes and destroyed businesses while the storm surge breached the 
                                                                                                                      
* Senior Articles Editor, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2006–2007). 
1 Press Release, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, By the Numbers: FEMA Recovery Up-
date in Louisiana (Feb. 28, 2006), http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=23900. 
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, FEMA director Michael Brown resigned and Congress 
held hearings to look into the failures of the federal response. See Ted Barrett, Former FEMA 
Director Brown to Testify at House Hearing, Sept. 21, 2005, CNN.com, http://www.cnn.com/ 
 2005/POLITICS/09/21/katrina.hearings/index.html. At least one commentator viewed 
the Congressional investigation as long overdue. See Shailagh Murray, Storms Show a System 
out of Balance: GOP Congress Has Reduced Usual Diet of Agency Oversight, Wash. Post, Oct. 5, 
2005, at A21. 
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levees and ºooded wide swaths of the city, which lies below sea level.2 
New Orleans residents ºed their homes and neighborhoods and 
sought refuge where they could ªnd it.3 Americans opened their doors 
and pockets to help the hurricane victims while the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) eventually took the reins of the federal 
relief effort.4
 Just a week after the devastating hurricane hit, former ªrst lady 
Barbara Bush gave an interview from the Houston Astrodome where a 
large number of evacuees, mostly African-American, were temporarily 
housed.5 She commented, 
Almost everyone I’ve talked to says, “We’re going to move to 
Houston.” . . . What I’m hearing, which is sort of scary, is that 
they all want to move to Texas. Everyone is so overwhelmed 
by the hospitality. . . . And so many of the people in the 
arena here, you know, were underprivileged anyway, so this is 
working very well for them.6
 Combined with local outrage that the federal government was 
slow to act following the hurricane, Mrs. Bush’s statements led some 
commentators to conclude that the government generally was indif-
ferent to the plight of certain residents of New Orleans.7 One African-
American member of the House even indicated that poor African-
                                                                                                                      
2 See Hurricane Katrina Timeline, CBC News Online, Sept. 4, 2005, http://www.cbc. 
ca/news/background/katrina/katrina_timeline.html. 
3 See Kate Moran, Shrinking City: No One Disputes That Katrina Will Reduce Population of 
the New Orleans Area, but Just How Much Is Unclear, Times-Picayune (New Orleans), Oct. 23, 
2005, at 1 (noting that Hurricane Katrina will likely compound the population decline that 
was already occurring before the storm). During and after the storm, some New Orleans 
residents evacuated their homes and went to the New Orleans Superdome. Hurricane 
Katrina Timeline, supra note 2. Other evacuees went to the New Orleans Convention Cen-
ter. Id. On August 31, 2005, the ªrst busloads of evacuees were taken to the Houston As-
trodome for temporary shelter. Id. Within a few days, New Orleans residents evacuated to 
both local and distant states. Id. 
4 See Hurricane Katrina Timeline, supra note 2. 
5 Relocation ‘Working Very Well’ for Poor Evacuees, Barbara Bush Says, Dallas Morning 
News, Sept. 6, 2005, at 16A. “The remarks were part of a larger story about the impact of a 
mass inºux on the city.” Id. 
6 Id. 
7 See G. Robert Hillman & Todd J. Gillman, Claims of Prejudice Taint Recovery: White 
House Defends Effort to Help All Races Affected by Katrina, Dallas Morning News, Sept. 17, 
2005, at 21A. 
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Americans in New Orleans feared the hurricane would be an oppor-
tunity to rid the city of low-income inhabitants.8
 President Bush, speaking for the ªrst time after the disaster in a 
nationally televised speech from Jackson Square, acknowledged that 
perceived indifference had deep roots in New Orleans.9 President Bush 
referred to “some deep, persistent poverty in this region” and “a history 
of racial discrimination, which cut off generations from the opportunity 
of America.”10 He stated, “We have a duty to confront this poverty with 
bold action,” and listed minority-owned businesses, minority homeown-
ership, and job training as parts of this proposed “bold action.”11
 Yet, as Katherine Boo of the New Yorker pointed out, “[t]wo weeks 
later, members of the Republican Party were using the [persistent pov-
erty] of the evacuees as evidence that contemporary anti-poverty ap-
proaches were ineffectual.”12 Ironically, these proposals would reduce 
the funds that many poor New Orleans citizens rely upon for health 
care and other social programs in order to rebuild a city seeking to 
combat poverty.13 Reduction in funding for social programs followed 
the administration’s efforts to curtail or eliminate funding for some of 
the most widely used federal social programs that help provide afford-
able housing to poor Americans.14
 In addition to restoring basic services to the city and surrounding 
areas, federal and local governments are also beginning to formulate a 
plan for the future.15 However, at least one commentator has remarked 
that various groups’ ideas seem to be a “reversion to form, as opposed 
to engagement with the problem.”16 Political action groups and parti-
san politicians, rather than taking a hard look at the speciªc issues in 
                                                                                                                      
8 See id. Rep. Eddie Bernice Johnson (D-Tx.) was quoted as saying, “The fear now is 
that it will all be gentriªcation where they just throw the poor people out.” Id. 
9 Press Release, White House, President Discusses Hurricane Relief in Address to the Na-
tion (Sept. 15, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/2005 
0915-8.html [hereinafter White House, President Discusses Hurricane Relief]. 
10 Id. 
11 See id. 
12 Katherine Boo, Shelter and the Storm: When Katrina’s Victims Came to Town, New 
Yorker, Nov. 28, 2005, at 86. 
13 See id. (observing that the congressional debate centered on cutting Medicaid and 
other social programs to offset the reconstruction of New Orleans). 
14 Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Saving Our Cities: What Role Should the Federal Government Play?, 
36 Urb. Law. 475, 475–76 (2004). 
15 See Nicholas Lemann, Comment, Rebuilding, New Yorker, Oct. 10, 2005, at 32. 
16 See id. at 31. Lemann notes that groups like The Heritage Foundation, The Ameri-
can Enterprise Institute, and MoveOn.org seem to be using the disaster to advance their 
pre-established political agendas. See id. He says, “A sense of political opportunity in Wash-
ington, rather than urgent need in Louisiana, pervades the discussion.” Id. at 31–32. 
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New Orleans, prefer to see the disaster as a means to push established 
policy issues such as deregulation or criticism of the current admini-
stration.17 Bucking that trend is one Republican lawmaker from subur-
ban Baton Rouge, Rep. Richard H. Baker (R-La.).18 Though he “de-
rides Democrats for not being sufªciently free-market,” Baker’s 
proposed recovery plan “would spend as much as $80 billion to pay off 
lenders, restore public works, buy huge ruined chunks of the city, clean 
them up and then sell them back to developers.”19 Unfortunately, 
though Baker initially thought the White House supported his plan, 
the Bush Administration recently stated that it opposed the Baker plan 
and thought the funds already earmarked for the Gulf would be 
sufªcient.20 Furthermore, in the last legislative session, Baker’s pro-
posal never garnered enough support to pass the the House Financial 
Services Committee and was cleared from the books at the end of the 
session.21
 However, the legislative appropriations already passed by Con-
gress are insufªcient to address the rebuilding needs of New Or-
leans.22 Speciªcally, the federal government’s response to Katrina 
contains no plan for improving housing affordability and quality for 
the poor in New Orleans who felt abandoned by their government.23 
Even before Hurricane Katrina, Professor Peter W. Salsich, Jr. exam-
ined what the federal government’s role in affordable housing should 
be in the United States and concluded that existing programs could 
be improved and adapted to make them more amenable to local con-
ditions.24 He argued that despite the positive news that existing pro-
grams have some measure of success, federal programs have never 
                                                                                                                      
17 See id. 
18 See Adam Nossiter, A Big Government Fix-It Plan for New Orleans, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 
2006, at A1. 
19 Id. 
20 Bill Walsh, White House Against Baker Bailout Bill: Bush Point Man Says Block Grants 
Enough, Times-Picayune (New Orleans), Jan. 25, 2006, at 1 (stating that the White House’s 
estimate of ºood-damaged homes eligible for Federal assistance is far below the estimate 
of 77,340 by the Louisiana Recovery Authority). 
21 See GovTrack.us, H.R. 4100 [109th]: Louisiana Recovery Corp. Act, http://www.gov- 
track.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-4100 (last visited Jan. 30, 2007) [hereinafter Gov-
Track.us, H.R. 4200]. GovTrack.us is a website that compiles information about legislation 
from a variety of governmental sources and is independent, meaning it is not afªliated 
with the government or any other group. GovTrack.us, homepage, http://www.govtrack.us 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2007). 
22 See id. 
23 See id. 
24 Salsich, supra note 14, at 510. 
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had a level of funding that reºects the severity of the problem facing 
poor citizens in many American cities.25
 The lack of affordable housing is an issue that impacts every part 
of the United States, not just New Orleans, and nationwide affordability 
appears to be getting worse over time.26 Recent studies indicate that 
“an increasing number of full-time workers, as well as unemployed or 
part-time workers, cannot afford to purchase a home; fully employed 
people making minimum wage cannot afford rental housing without 
substantial governmental assistance; and homelessness remains a seri-
ous problem for individuals with families, even those with jobs.”27 The 
National Low Income Housing Coalition estimates that “about 95 mil-
lion Americans have serious affordable-housing problems—either they 
live in dilapidated housing or they must pay more than 30 percent of 
their income for housing.”28
 In New Orleans, public-housing residents were displaced from 
the city at a rate of nearly ninety percent after Hurricane Katrina.29 
About the same percentage of the more than 9000 Section 8 voucher 
holders have not obtained housing again in New Orleans.30 The lack 
of funding for affordable housing commensurate with the need will 
be especially severe in New Orleans, where much of the affordable 
stock that existed before the storm is utterly destroyed or uninhabit-
able and demand problems are acute.31
 Underscoring the need for a response that will successfully meet 
the needs of New Orleans’s African-American and poor residents is 
President Bush’s reference to “a history of racial discrimination.”32 By 
placing discrimination issues in the past, President Bush risks mini-
mizing the omnipresent issue of race which has pervaded the African-
                                                                                                                      
25 See id. 
26 See id. at 476. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 James Perry, Op-Ed., Business Moves in on Homes, Times-Picayune (New Orleans), 
Jan. 23, 2006, at 4. James Perry is the Executive Director of GNO Fair Housing Action Cen-
ter, Inc., New Orleans. Id. 
30 See id. Very low-income families are allowed to choose rental housing under the Sec-
tion 8 Rental Voucher Program, which increases affordable housing choices. U.S. Dept. of 
Hous. & Urban Dev, Section 8 Rental Voucher Program (May 13, 2004), http://www.hud. 
gov/progdesc/voucher.cfm. The renters pay thirty percent of their household income 
while the HUD pays the remainder up to eighty to one-hundred percent of fair market 
value. Id. The renters have the option to rent a unit either above or below the fair market 
rental value in their city, and can either pay or keep the difference, respectively. Id. 
31 See Salsich, supra note 14, at 510. 
32 See Walsh, supra note 20. 
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American perception of any government response.33 Kalamu ya Sa-
laam is the best-known writer to originate from the Ninth Ward in 
New Orleans, a poor African-American community that suffered some 
of the worst ºood damage after Hurricane Katrina.34 In an interview 
with the New Yorker, Kalamu recalled the following example of past 
racism: 
[I]n 1927, in the midst of the worst ºooding of the Mississippi 
River in recorded history, the white city fathers of New Or-
leans—the men of the Louisiana Club, the Boston Club, and 
the Pickwick Club—won permission from the federal gov-
ernment to dynamite the Caernarvon levee, downriver from 
the city, to keep their interests dry. But destroying the levee 
also insured that the surrounding poorer St. Bernard and 
Plaquemines Parishes would ºood. Thousands of the trappers 
who lived there lost their homes and their livelihoods.35
In another well-known incident in 1912, the New York Times reported 
that when a levee in Washington County, Mississippi was breached 
during a ºood, the engineers who ran out of sandbags “ordered . . . 
several hundred negroes . . . to lie on top of the levee and as close to-
gether as possible.”36 African-Americans in New Orleans are accus-
tomed to being marginalized and ignored by their leaders and by the 
federal government.37 A plan for the future of New Orleans would 
chart a new and innovative course toward poverty reduction using ex-
isting federal programs and new ideas like the Baker Bill.38
 This Note argues that the current focus on free-market solutions 
in the form of tax breaks and opportunity zones is not sufªcient to 
create adequate affordable-housing opportunities as New Orleans re-
builds. Truly “bold action” would set the goal of creating more afford-
able housing and sustainable communities than existed before the 
hurricane. The current legislative solution is unlikely to create new 
                                                                                                                      
33 Hillman & Gillman, supra note 7. 
34 David Remnick, How Presidents and Citizens React to Disaster, New Yorker, Oct. 3, 
2005, at 56. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. “Patricia Turner at the University of California . . . has written extensively on the 
role of rumor and conspiracy theory in the African-American community, especially 
among the poor . . . and [has made] a convincing case that these counter-narratives 
emerge from decades of institutional racism and from particular episodes in American 
history.” Id. 
37 See id. 
38 See Nossiter, supra note 18. 
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opportunities for affordable housing because it ignores recovery suc-
cesses in previous disaster areas, and refuses to support Rep. Baker’s 
buyout plan in New Orleans. Baker’s plan was a good compromise 
between free-market principles and progressive ideals about adapting 
institutions to address poverty, and deserves reconsideration. Part I of 
this Note chronicles a brief history of trends in federal affordable-
housing involvement that evolved into the free-market approach fa-
vored by the current Bush Administration. Part II discusses the Baker 
Bill and ways in which it addressed both free-market considerations 
and presented new ideas for future neighborhood development in 
New Orleans. Part III examines reconstruction efforts following two 
previous natural disasters that should inform rebuilding plans in New 
Orleans, comparing some of their successes to the Baker Bill’s provi-
sions. Part IV addresses a recent scholarly work that proposes a new 
way to think about poverty after Katrina and adopts a more pragmatic 
framework, one that refuses to accept that our institutions function 
properly as long as poverty exists. 
I. Legislative Action and Affordable Housing 
 Any rebuilding effort in New Orleans will have a profound effect 
on African-American and poor residents because of where the damage 
from the hurricane was most severe.39 A recent study by Dr. John R. 
Logan of Brown University found that, “[o]f the 354,000 people who 
lived in New Orleans neighborhoods where the subsequent damage was 
moderate to severe, 75 percent were black, 29 percent lived below the 
poverty line, more than 10 percent were unemployed, and more than 
half were renters.”40 Flooding damage was most severe in low-lying ar-
eas mostly populated by poor, African-American residents.41 As a result, 
affordable housing should be the priority in any proposed rebuilding 
plan.42
A. Federal Involvement in Affordable Housing Generally 
 Federal ideals regarding funding of affordable housing peaked in 
the 1940s when Congress stated in the Housing Act of 1949 that the 
federal government “should provide a decent home and suitable living 
                                                                                                                      
39 See James Dao, Study Says 80% of New Orleans Blacks May Not Return, N.Y. Times, Jan. 
26, 2006, at A18. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 See id. 
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environment for every American family.”43 Much of the stock of public 
housing, constructed to house America’s neediest citizens, was built as a 
result of federal largesse.44 Unfortunately, many of the housing projects 
built during that time became “dystopian superblocks” invested with 
crime and concentrated poverty.45 In one housing project in Washing-
ton, DC, when the project was ªnally shut down in the 1990s, the me-
dian income was only $7765 and more than eighty percent of the resi-
dents had no jobs.46
 Over the past ªfty years, federal affordable-housing programs have 
evolved from direct federal construction projects to incentives provided 
to free-market developers to build affordable housing.47 During the 
Nixon Administration, the federal government started issuing rental 
vouchers for the poor to live in private housing instead of building new 
projects.48 Since 1976, the share of new federal spending on subsidized 
housing has fallen eighty percent; in 2006 there was virtually no new 
housing production for low-income Americans.49 It comes as no sur-
prise that the problem of affordability appears to be getting worse.50
 When the federal government stepped out of the home-building 
business, local organizations ªlled in to develop grassroots solutions 
to community housing issues.51 In response, local communities cre-
ated an innovative new model for affordable housing—mixed-income 
communities that no longer look like public-housing projects and 
cannot be distinguished from the surrounding neighborhoods.52 Cit-
                                                                                                                      
 
43 Id. 
44 See Dan Nnamdi Mbulu, Affordable Housing: How Effective Are Existing Federal Laws in 
Addressing the Housing Needs of Lower Income Families?, 8 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 
387, 393 (2000). 
45 See Andrew Rice, The Suburban Solution, N.Y. Times Mag., Mar. 5, 2006, at 114. 
46 Id. 
47 See id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 See Rice, supra note 45, at 114. 
51 See id.; see also Mbulu, supra note 44, at 393. Rice’s article notes that Reagan ran for 
president in 1980 on the idea that communities would be better off if the federal govern-
ment stayed away from local issues and left the decisions to those who lived in the area. 
Rice, supra note 45, at 114. 
52 See Rice, supra note 45, at 114. The following depiction of a mixed-income develop-
ment is common in its laudatory language and encouraging description: 
 A new $103 million mixed-income housing development has added new 
life to the Boyle Heights community here. Pueblo Del Sol, which replaced a 
dilapidated, crime-ridden housing project known as Aliso Village, is the larg-
est public housing revitalization to take place in California, providing resi-
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ies can combine federal grants intended to replace outdated and un-
safe public housing with private investment.53 Then, the city or devel-
oper will create new housing in which some residents who are below 
the poverty line rent apartments and other low-income families have 
the opportunity to buy at reduced rates.54 Some cities will even pass 
“inclusionary zoning” ordinances that require builders of large new 
developments to set aside a certain percentage of the units for buyers 
or renters with low to moderate incomes.55 The result is less concen-
trated poverty and more attractive, livable housing.56 However, de-
stroying old buildings in favor of mixed-income housing results in a 
net loss of available housing units, contributing to increases in de-
mand.57 In addition, many of the mixed-income units beneªt those 
living at the higher-income end of the poverty scale, leaving some of 
the poorest Americans behind.58
 It is rare to ªnd anyone who prefers the horrible housing projects 
of the 1940s.59 Rather, the more recent locally controlled, mixed-
income model is immensely popular with both liberals and conserva-
tives and seems to be a successful development.60 But helping only the 
                                                                                                                      
 
dents with 470 units of much-needed affordable housing and various com-
munity and social services. 
 The development was created through a unique public/private partner-
ship between the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, The Related 
Cos. of California, McCormack Baron Salazar, SunAmerica Affordable Hous-
ing Partners and the Los Angeles Uniªed School District (LAUSD). Private 
equity totaling $52 million was raised through the sale of Low Income Hous-
ing Tax Credits that were syndicated by SunAmerica and sold to Fannie Mae. 
 Built under HUD's Hope VI program, Pueblo Del Sol boasts a sustainable 
living environment, incorporating mixed-income housing (rental and for-
sale) with educational and recreational facilities; community supportive facili-
ties, such as two community centers with an exercise room and pool, as well as 
a park with new play equipment; and services such as job training, after-
school programs, computer training classes and general social services. 
Moreover, the existing LAUSD Utah Elementary School is located in the cen-
ter of the development. 
A $103M Mixed-Income Development Breathes New Life into L.A. Neighborhood, Multi-Housing 
News, Oct. 16, 2003, available at http://www.multihousingnews.com/multihousing/head 
lines/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=2005340. 
53 See infra Part I.B.1. 
54 Rice, supra note 45, at 114. 
55 Id. 
56 See id. 
57 See id. 
58 See id. 
59 See Rice, supra note 45, at 114. 
60 See id.; Renée Lewis Glover, Atlanta Hous. Auth., Making a Case for Mixed-
Use, Mixed-Income Communities to Address America’s Affordable Housing Needs 
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least poor of low-income Americans is not enough.61 In many places, 
mixed-income development is not occurring at all because of staunch 
opposition to undesirable low-income housing from settled residents.62 
Hurricane Katrina presents a completely different environment for af-
fordable-housing experimentation.63 Some neighborhoods are almost a 
blank slate for new development, and the federal government should 
not squander a chance to provide recently displaced and homeless New 
Orleans residents with the decent home and community every Ameri-
can deserves.64
B. Community Development Block Grant Financing 
1. Background 
 The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Program was 
passed under the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974.65 
Under the CDBG program, Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
funding moved away from a rigid federal administrative system to one 
that allowed more ºexibility to meet local needs.66 Federal funds are no 
longer administered directly to speciªc types of projects in the form of 
grants, but given to cities and states to use according to their needs.67 
Over the years, the CDBG program has increasingly restricted the use 
of funds to ensure that the funds are used in a way that creates eco-
nomic opportunities for low and moderate income residents.68 CDBG 
program funds may be used for twenty-ªve separate eligible activities, 
                                                                                                                      
(Presentation to the Center for American Progress) 1 (2005), available at http:// 
www.americanprogress.org/kf/glover.pdf. Glover says that mixed-income communities 
discourage segregation, which is an added beneªt. See Glover, supra, at 6. 
61 See Rice, supra note 45, at 114. 
62 See id. 
63 See Meghan Gordon, Quick Sell: As Home Sales Zoom in St. Tammany, Potential Buyers 
Need to Act Fast—and They Must Come Ready to Make a High Offer with Checkbook in Hand, 
Times-Picayune (New Orleans), Dec. 1, 2005, at 1. 
64 See id. 
65 Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 116, 88 
Stat. 633, 652 (codiªed as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5316 (2004)). 
66 See Salsich, supra note 14, at 484; see also Paulette J. Williams, The Continuing Crisis in 
Affordable Housing: Systemic Issues Requiring Systemic Solutions, 31 Fordham Urb. L.J. 413, 479 
(2004) (arguing the need for a national, affordable housing policy with a clearly deªned 
mission that is accountable to multiple and varying interests). 
67 See 42 U.S.C. § 5303 (2004); Salsich, supra note 14, at 484. 
68 See 42 U.S.C. § 5301(c); Salsich, supra note 14, at 484. 
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among them rehabilitating existing affordable-housing units and build-
ing new units altogether.69
 One academic has written that the CDBG program “is best under-
stood as a gap-ªlling incentive” to “provide lump sums to states and cit-
ies to enable them to plug holes in ªnancing plans for major develop-
ments and/or to provide some or all of the public infrastructure, such 
as streets and utility lines, for such developments.”70 CDBG program 
funds were not intended to fund new capital improvement projects.71 
In the 2005 budget, CDBG appropriation levels had reached about $5 
billion nationwide.72
2. CDBG Appropriations in Response to Hurricane Katrina 
 CDBG program funds have not generally been viewed by the lo-
cal governments in the Gulf as simple gap-ªlling incentives, but rather 
as crucial federal funding for the rebuilding effort.73 At the end of its 
term last year, Congress approved a hurricane aid package that in-
cluded up to $6.2 billion in grant money for Louisiana and $5.3 bil-
lion for Mississippi, the two states hardest hit by Hurricane Katrina.74 
But Louisiana ofªcials say that the $6.2 billion “is nowhere near 
enough for the level of damage to homes, schools, hospitals and busi-
nesses, which they say far overshadows the destruction in Mississippi 
and the other Gulf Coast states.”75 Both Louisiana and Mississippi 
plan to use the CDBG program earmarks to reimburse homeowners 
against uninsured losses.76 However, the grants are also earmarked to 
repair schools and hospitals, so some of the money will likely go for 
that purpose according to the traditional infrastructure-building uses 
allowed under the CDBG program.77
                                                                                                                      
69 See 42 U.S.C. § 5305(a); see also Salsich, supra note 14, at 484 (noting that, originally, 
CDBG program funds could not be used to create new housing, but “as federal support for 
housing production has declined, limitations on the use of CDBG funds to support new 
construction have been relaxed”). 
70 Salsich, supra note 14, at 484–86. 
71 Id. at 485. 
72 Id. at 487. The program “has been an important but relatively small component of 
the total federal effort in housing and community development.” Id. at 486. 
73 See id. at 484–85; Nossiter, supra note 18. 
74 Bill Walsh, Louisiana Feeling Shortchanged: Mississippi’s Clout Gives Its Residents an Edge, 
Times-Picayune (New Orleans), Jan. 20, 2006, at 1. 
75 Id. 
76 See id. 
77 See id.; Salsich, supra note 14, at 484–86. 
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 Both Mississippi and the Louisiana Recovery Authority plan to 
focus CDBG program funds on reimbursing homeowners “who lacked 
insurance and whose property lies outside the federally designated 
ºood plain.”78 These homeowners are perceived as the hardest hit by 
losses because they did not anticipate that their homes would ºood, 
and therefore were not required to purchase insurance against that 
type of disaster.79 However, Louisiana estimates that 77,000 home-
owners fall into this category, compared with 35,000 in Mississippi.80 
The Louisiana Recovery Authority estimates it would take over $9 bil-
lion in CDBG program funds to match Mississippi’s per-household 
payout.81 Many people in Louisiana are frustrated by the inequality 
and have linked it to the power of Mississippi Republican Sen. Thad 
Cochran, the inºuential Senate Appropriations Committee chairman 
who was instrumental in securing the overall bailout package.82
 Though the White House has said that the $6.2 billion given to 
Louisiana would be sufªcient to reimburse the hardest-hit homeown-
ers, it seems that many in New Orleans expect more CDBG assistance 
for housing or other funding to be absolutely necessary to fully re-
build New Orleans.83
C. Other Appropriations 
 The remaining appropriations have gone to various purposes, 
namely immediate, temporary-housing assistance for displaced resi-
dents; levee repair; and reimbursements to organizations that took in 
displaced persons.84 President Bush says a total of $85 billion in fed-
                                                                                                                      
 
78 Walsh, supra note 74. 
79 Walsh, supra note 20. 
80 Walsh, supra note 74. The Louisiana Recovery Authority estimates that 77,340 
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81 See Walsh, supra note 74. 
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tance will be crucial in future appropriations. See id. 
83 See Walsh, supra note 20. 
84 See Bruce Alpert, Katrina Relief Package Close to Passage: Homeowner Losses, Levees May 
Be Funded, Times-Picayune (New Orleans), Dec. 18, 2005, at 1; see also Eric Lipton, Leaders 
in Congress Agree on Aid for Gulf Recovery, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 2005, at A29 (reporting on 
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supra. On December 18, 2005, a second appropriations bill reallocated $29 billion of the 
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eral assistance has been designated to assist with the recovery and re-
building of Hurricane Katrina.85 Included in that $85 billion total is 
an almost $8 billion appropriation for tax credits to businesses and 
homeowners in the gulf region through the Katrina Emergency Tax 
Relief Act of 2005.86 This resulting “Gulf Opportunity Zone” is the 
cornerstone of President Bush’s rebuilding effort and combines an 
existing federal program with the White House’s initial plan offered 
after the hurricane.87
 The recent Gulf Opportunity Zone owes its roots to an “Enterprise 
Zone” program in Great Britain from the late 1970s designed “to stimu-
late industrial activity in London’s vacant docklands district through a 
drastic reduction of taxes and regulation.”88 Reagan supported the idea 
in the 1980s but the program never received sufªcient funding.89 Con-
gress funded a version of the Enterprise Zone program in 1993 during 
the Clinton Administration, calling it the Empowerment Zone and En-
terprise Community program.90 The 1993 version modiªed the free-
market approach to empower local communities to create solutions to 
their housing and neighborhood needs.91
 President Bush’s “Opportunity Zone” returns to the original Brit-
ish and Reagan model, offering $8 billion in tax incentives that are 
mostly targeted at encouraging businesses to open in the gulf region.92 
The housing-related provisions of President Bush’s New Markets Tax 
Credit allow a state to receive up to $1 billion in tax credits to build low-
income housing and encourage businesses to relocate to low-income 
                                                                                                                      
original $62 billion. Alpert, supra; Lipton, supra. The CDBG program funds were allocated 
as a result of this December appropriation bill. See Alpert, supra; Lipton, supra. 
85 Dao, supra note 39. 
86 Bill Walsh, $8 Billion Tax Break Approved: House, Senate Pass Plan for Gulf Coast, Times-
Picayune (New Orleans), Dec. 17, 2005, at 1; Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., In-
formation for Taxpayers Affected by Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma ( Jan. 2006), 
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87 See Mbulu, supra note 44, at 404–06; White House, President Discusses Hurricane 
Relief, supra note 9. 
88 Mbulu, supra note 44, at 404 (quoting Audrey G. McFarlane, Empowerment Zones: Ur-
ban Revitalization Through Collaborative Enterprise, 5 J. Affordable Housing & Community 
Dev. L. 35, 36–37 (1995)). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 403–04. 
91 Id. at 405. 
92 See Walsh, supra note 86. 
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neighborhoods.93 Though the tax breaks were passed by the House and 
Senate unanimously, some legislators argued that the tax credits were a 
“giveaway to special interests” and that businesses would relocate in the 
area anyway.94 What is clear is that the tax incentive package allocates 
only a very small amount of tax beneªts that relate to the production of 
new affordable housing.95
II. The Baker Buyout Proposal 
 On October 20, 2005, Louisiana congressman Richard H. Baker 
introduced legislation detailing his proposed rebuilding plan for Lou-
isiana, known as the Baker Bill.96 Richard Baker is a Republican who 
has spent considerable time in ofªce trying to impose restrictions on 
governmental lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.97 Baker, a pro-
fessed free-market supporter, toured neighborhoods soon after Katrina 
and announced that traditional recovery methods would be inadequate 
since this “was a problem way beyond the capacity of private enter-
prise.”98 The Baker Bill he drafted in response to the hurricane’s devas-
                                                                                                                      
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 See id. One academic has argued that the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, such as 
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Proªting from Poverty: The Competition Between For-Proªt & Nonproªt Developers for Low-Income 
Housing Tax Credits, 55 Hastings L.J. 211, 243–44 (2003). 
96 Louisiana Recovery Corporation Act, H.R. 4100, 119th Cong. (as reported by H. 
Comm. on Fin. Servs., Dec. 15, 2005); Press Release, House Comm. on Fin. Servs., Com-
mittee Approves Baker’s Louisiana Recovery Corporation Act (Dec. 15, 2005), available at 
http://ªnancialservices.house.gov/news.asp [hereinafter House Comm. on Fin. Servs., 
Committee Approves Corporation]. 
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Rouge and the surrounding suburbs. Rep. Richard H. Baker, Louisiana and the 6th Dis-
trict, http://baker.house.gov/html/district.cfm (last visited Oct. 15, 2006). The district is 
mostly white and suburban in makeup. See Nossiter, supra note 18. The area is also “rela-
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the east.” Id. Yet, as Nossiter points out, the most likely beneªciaries of his proposed bill 
are African-American New Orleans residents. Id. 
98 See Nossiter, supra note 18. Rep. Baker joins other congressional Republicans who 
have made unfortunate comments about hurricane victims. Posting of John Mercurio to 
CNN.com’s The Situation Report: The Morning Grind, http://www.cnn.com/2005/ 
POLITICS/09/09/sr.fri/ (Sept. 9, 2005, 08:50 EST). The Wall Street Journal’s “Washington 
Wire” reported that Baker said to lobbyists: “We ªnally cleaned up public housing in New 
Orleans. We couldn’t do it, but God did.” Id. Baker explained later that he did not intend 
ºippancy, but has long wanted to “improve” low-income housing in New Orleans. Id. 
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tation was a detailed, well-considered rebuilding plan and should be 
reintroduced during the current legislative session.99
A. Structure of the Corporation 
 The Baker Bill proposed the creation of a federal agency called the 
Louisiana Recovery Corporation (the “Corporation”), which would 
have been independently established in the executive branch.100 Six 
separate divisions of the Corporation were to include: environment and 
land use management; economic development; property acquisition; 
property management; property disposition; and urban homesteading 
and community and faith-based organizations.101 The Corporation 
would have had a board of seven directors, appointed by the President, 
with qualiªcations related to the aforementioned divisions.102 Three of 
the seven directors, to be appointed by the President, would have been 
nominated by the Governor of Louisiana.103 The board was to be non-
partisan, with no more than four members of the Board from the same 
political party.104 None of the appointees could have been current pub-
lic employees, nor could they have been stockholders or employed by 
any institution that is a contract party with the Corporation during the 
time of their service.105
B. Local-Development Plans 
 Baker’s Bill allowed for local input from a variety of sources, as well 
as accountability through public hearings.106 Each Louisiana parish in 
which the Corporation operates would have established a “local advi-
sory council” consisting of locally elected ofªcials, community groups, 
and other “interested, qualiªed groups as the Corporation may deter-
mine to be appropriate.”107 The Corporation was to consult with the 
                                                                                                                      
99 See generally H.R. 4100. 
100 H.R. 4100 § 102(a), (b). 
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members of the local advisory council and hold public meetings before 
major decisions were made.108 In addition, any actions taken by the 
Corporation would have to conform to existing local redevelopment 
plans.109 Deference to local planning was explicit, as the Corporation 
does not allow solicitation of bids that conºict with a local govern-
ment’s existing redevelopment plan.110
C. Funding the Corporation 
 In 2006, the Baker Bill would have allocated $100 million of al-
ready-appropriated federal Katrina disaster-relief funds toward start-
up costs for the Corporation.111 Thereafter, the federal government 
would have assigned at most $30 billion in stock to the Corporation 
which was to be bought through a public debt transaction.112 Thus, 
the federal government would have ªnanced the corporation through 
bonds issued by the Treasury.113 The Corporation was to be held ac-
countable for its ªnances through a quarterly and annual reporting 
system that operates very much like a private company’s, with empha-
sis on public disclosure and accountability.114
D. The Corporation’s Objectives 
 The Corporation would have had a very general mission of eco-
nomic stabilization and redevelopment of areas of Louisiana “devas-
tated or signiªcantly distressed” by Hurricane Katrina.115 Homeowners 
with mortgages were mostly given only a ninety-day forbearance period 
by their banks to delay their mortgage obligations.116 Many New Or-
leans residents are unsure whether they will be able to rebuild because 
they must continue mortgage payments or must ªght insurers for dam-
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age reimbursement.117 The Baker Bill proposed paying up to $500,000 
per homeowner to relieve the owner of his or her required mortgage 
payments, erasing the homeowner’s debt on questionably valued prop-
erty and transferring title to the Corporation.118 In addition, the Cor-
poration would have paid owners of ºood-damaged property at least 
sixty percent of the equity in their homes.119 Once the Corporation ac-
quired a number of properties in the same area, the properties were to 
be packaged together and the Corporation would have made necessary 
infrastructure repairs.120 The refurbished property would have then 
been sold to developers through a competitive-bidding process for re-
development of structures and neighborhoods.121
 Through a revision of the bill undertaken a month after he pro-
posed it, Baker added provisions to protect individual property rights.122 
Under the revised bill, current property owners could have contracted 
with the Corporation to retain a right of ªrst refusal to buy a similarly 
sized and situated piece of land after the infrastructure was repaired.123 
In addition, current property owners could have contracted to retain 
interest in a similarly sized and situated piece of land.124 These provi-
sions seemed to provide a mechanism for current owners to attempt to 
return to newly rebuilt neighborhoods if they could muster the re-
sources.125 As an added bonus, the Corporation may even have been 
able to turn a proªt by selling the renovated land to developers for 
more than the mortgage payoff amount.126
E. Competitive-Bidding Process and Affordable Housing 
 The Corporation’s function, though highly similar to a private 
company, diverged from a private land-development company in the 
criteria enumerated for the competitive-bidding process.127 Rather 
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than selling the refurbished land to the highest bidder, the Corpora-
tion’s bidding process would have been a more subjective one, taking 
into consideration a variety of issues.128 According to the Baker Bill, 
[p]urchasers are selected based on an ability to meet select 
criteria established by the Corporation, which shall include 
the following: 
(1)  Capacity to oversee major development projects through 
a community-based collaborative process. 
(2)  Commitment of private capital. 
(3)  Effective deployment of Federal National Mortgage Asso-
ciation, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, 
Federal home loan bank, and other Federal or State re-
sources (such as low-income housing tax credits, new 
markets tax credits, the HOPE IV program, enterprise 
zones, and the Historically Underutilized Business Zones 
or section 8(a) Programs of the Small Business Admini-
stration) to ensure construction of affordable housing. 
(4)  Use of private contractors and subcontractors. 
(5)  Use of local corporations and local employees. 
(6)  Use of small, disadvantaged business enterprise contrac-
tors or subcontractors. 
(7)  Scale of development and job creation. 
(8)  Increased homeownership.129
Thus, the Corporation would not have been able to dispense with 
land without ªrst considering the total impact on the housing and job 
market of the neighborhood and parish.130 Baker’s plan also explicitly 
stated that the use of federal tax incentives to ensure construction of 
affordable housing was third on the list of bidding considerations, 
after only community input and ªnancing.131
 The second part of the Baker Bill complemented the buyout plan 
by calling for allocation of federal funds to existing affordable-housing 
programs to supplement the Corporation.132 Had the Baker Bill 
passed in Congress, the rebuilding effort would have been aided by 
funds allocated to: 
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• Section 9 (providing funds for capital improvements to public 
housing); 
• Hope VI (providing funds for demolition of aging and ineffective 
existing public housing to construct newer public housing); 
• HOME Investment Partnerships Program (providing funding to 
communities in connection with nonproªt groups to build or re-
habilitate affordable housing for rental or purchase); 
• CDBG grants (providing discretionary grant money to localities); 
and 
• Section 8 (providing rental assistance vouchers to low-income 
persons).133 
Finally, the bill was to use leftover funds to provide housing counsel-
ing to those still in temporary housing.134
 Together, the two parts of the Baker Bill provided a comprehensive 
rebuilding plan for the future of New Orleans.135 While this plan in-
cluded the creation of a new government agency involved in the real 
estate development business, it also used existing federal housing pro-
grams to supplement the efforts of the Corporation.136 Most impor-
tantly, the Baker Bill would have allocated $30 billion in federal fund-
ing and mandated community involvement to the rebuilding 
process.137
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F. Arguments for and Against the Baker Bill 
 On January 24, 2006, the White House ofªcially came out against 
the Baker Bill, stating that the already-allocated CDBG ªnancing 
would be sufªcient to compensate those homeowners hardest hit by 
the hurricane.138 However, a coherent plan for rebuilding is missing 
from the existing funding.139 The White House seems content to al-
low state and local ofªcials to formulate their own plans for rebuild-
ing, but state and local ofªcials believe that much more money will be 
needed in order to rebuild effectively.140
 In the absence of a mortgage-buyout program like Baker’s, pri-
vate entities, through the free market, may go ahead and step in to 
bail out homeowners and refurbish the land on their own, later sell-
ing the land or developing it as an investment.141 However, the differ-
ence is that a private developer’s priorities are not likely to include 
affordable housing, but rather will focus on making as much money 
as possible.142 The Baker Bill had speciªc requirements for bidding 
on land that took into account the needs and demands of the com-
munity, more funding, and a built-in accountability mechanism akin 
to a private corporation’s.143
 Local and state ofªcials also liked the Baker Bill because of its 
potential to avoid a “jack-o’-lantern effect” during the rebuilding 
process.144 This describes a situation where some people who have the 
ªnancial ability to rebuild will do so, but surrounding areas are not 
rebuilt and become blighted.145 The results are pockets of rebuilding 
and pockets of decay, like the gap-ªlled smile of a jack-o’-lantern.146
 Another concern for the rebuilding effort is the possibility that 
many residents will not be able to rebuild in low-lying areas because 
these areas are so likely to ºood in the future that they are considered 
unsafe for future redevelopment.147 Supporters of the Baker Bill 
claimed that some sort of buy-out program “is a crucial component of 
plans to help homeowners who are willing to move to higher ground 
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but otherwise would be forced to renovate their ºooded properties 
where they sit, or walk away and face foreclosure because of their ºood 
insurance payouts.”148 If homeowners had assistance through the Baker 
Bill’s rights of ªrst refusal and retaining interest in a similar piece of 
property, the goal of a more densely populated New Orleans would be 
more easily achieved.149
 Opponents of the Baker Bill were uncomfortable with creating a 
massive government bureaucracy instead of leaving recovery up to the 
market.150 Despite an early lack of White House support, Baker vowed 
to take the issue to the legislature.151 On December 15, 2005, the 
House Committee on Financial Services approved the Baker Bill by a 
vote of ªfty to nine, sending the legislation to the full House of Repre-
sentatives.152 However, after that the Baker Bill stalled in the Commit-
tee, and with the expiration of the last legislative session, the bill was 
cleared from the books.153 In order to be reconsidered, the Baker Bill 
ªrst must be reintroduced in the current legislative session.154
III. What Can Be Learned From Previous Disasters? 
A. The Grand Forks, North Dakota Flood and Its Local Buyback Program 
 Commentators in New Orleans have pointed out that the rebuild-
ing challenges facing the city are different than after past hurricanes 
because of the scale and nature of the damage.155 The devastation in 
New Orleans after Katrina was in large part caused by ºooding after 
the breach of the levees, not by direct damage from hurricane-force 
winds and rain.156 Thus, it is most valuable to look at previous ºoods 
instead of hurricanes to see what lessons the federal government 
should take from past disaster relief efforts.157
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1. The 1997 Grand Forks Flood 
 In April 1997, 52,000 residents of Grand Forks, North Dakota were 
awakened in the middle of the night and told to evacuate their 
homes.158 The nearby Red River had ºooded its banks, resulting in 
ºooding in ninety percent of the city and ªres in eleven downtown 
buildings.159 In all, 8600 homes, or seventy-ªve percent of single-family 
units, were ºooded, 1600 of 15,000 apartments had ºood damage, and 
the entire downtown was affected.160 Though the area has just a little 
more than one-tenth of the population of New Orleans, Grand Forks 
faced challenges that are very similar to those confronting New Or-
leans.161 It is most important to look at the rebuilding effort in Grand 
Forks because it is generally considered to be a success story in rebuild-
ing management.162 After an initial dip in population of ten percent, 
the population of the area is the same now as it was before the 1997 
ºood.163 Most importantly, residents and city leaders usually say the city 
is better than before.164
2. Federal and Local Responses in Grand Forks 
 In contrast to the response to Hurricane Katrina, the immediate 
federal response to the Grand Forks ºood was generally perceived as 
excellent.165 FEMA director James Witt even visited the town before 
the ºood arrived.166 In Grand Forks, Witt is revered among residents 
for his swift action during the crisis.167
 Federal funding was likewise rapidly forthcoming.168 Congress ap-
proved $5.6 billion appropriations bill for the area that designated 
money for buyouts, business loans, new infrastructure, and other 
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161 See Russell, supra note 155. 
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needs.169 If that amount were to be compared to the amount appropri-
ated so far in New Orleans on a per-capita basis, it would equal about 
$100 million for New Orleans alone.170 This is a great deal more per 
person than the $82 million President Bush has appropriated so far, 
much in tax credits, to the entire Gulf region.171
 Grand Forks’s rebuilding effort was spearheaded by a city buyback 
program funded with FEMA grants, money from the State of North 
Dakota, and CDBG grants from HUD.172 The buyback program re-
moved damaged structures from areas that were especially vulnerable 
to future ºooding and created open space in the structure’s place.173 
Residents could voluntarily participate in the buyback and received a 
price based on the pre-ºood assessment of the home and assistance in 
relocating to brand new neighborhoods built outside the ºoodplain.174 
Though the displacement was upsetting to many of the residents, the 
success of the rebuilding process has led many of the displaced to 
praise the program in retrospect.175 By holding ªrm to a policy that 
refused to relax local ºoodplain building ordinances in order to assist 
people with rebuilding efforts, the city took the harder route of enforc-
ing those restrictions and building a safer city in the long run.176
3. Lessons from Grand Forks 
 Applying a rebuilding plan in Grand Forks was eased by the small 
population and size of the community, unlike New Orleans which is 
much larger, and has far more diverse people and needs.177 Yet the in-
ªghting and bitterness that remains among some residents of Grand 
Forks indicates that no rebuilding effort will be easy.178 One of the local 
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ofªcials selected to lead the rebuilding effort with the Mayor said, “The 
leadership style you need to direct a recovery is not always a leadership 
style that makes everyone happy. . . . [I]f you try to do a recovery by 
consensus, nobody will agree and nothing will happen. So you do 
what’s right, and it may not be popular.”179 New Orleans is likely to face 
the same inªghting on the local level as various plans and proposals 
come forward.180 If reintroduced, the Baker Bill, by providing a federal 
mechanism for oversight and regulation of a buyout program, would 
centralize decision making regarding housing issues.181 However, the 
Baker Bill would maintain the link to vital input on the local level, and 
prioritize local needs in the competitive-bidding process.182 Further-
more, appointed leaders of Baker’s proposed Corporation would not 
have to face elections, and thus could focus on their duties without 
worrying excessively about the popularity of their decisions.183
 A vital lesson that the federal government should take from the 
ºood in Grand Forks is that its current appropriation levels are in-
sufªcient to fully rebuild a major American city.184 There is some ar-
gument that the problem of insufªcient funding may be more en-
demic than characteristic of policy choices.185 Joseph Singer, a noted 
property law scholar, has recently written that Americans after Katrina 
wanted the federal government to act, despite a strong American dis-
trust of big government.186 Unfortunately, the demand for action has 
not been strong enough to be sufªcient because although Americans 
saw that the needs in New Orleans were acute, there was no recogni-
tion that meeting those needs would require an increase in taxes and 
governmental regulation.187
 Finally, the most encouraging lesson to learn from Grand Forks is 
that rebuilding is possible, and that the city can come back better than 
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ever.188 Achieving this result in New Orleans will require a coherent 
plan supported by sufªcient federal funding.189 Grand Forks used fed-
eral funds to implement their own local buyback program, which was 
very successful.190 The Baker Bill proposal was more complicated be-
cause the goal was more than small-scale relocation and clearing of 
ºoodplains.191 More ambitiously, the Baker Bill proposed rebuilding 
existing neighborhoods with an eye to accommodating the speciªc 
needs of the area.192 Though the White House has claimed that the 
already-appropriated funds will be sufªcient, this is simply not the 
case.193 In addition, the already-appropriated funds may be sufªcient to 
assist the hardest-hit residents, but it may not be enough to fully rebuild 
the city in a way that improves on some serious affordability problems 
that existed before the storm.194
B. Hurricane Andrew as the Model for Private-Sector Involvement 
 Residents of Homestead, Florida, where Hurricane Andrew made 
landfall in 1992, credit much of the recovery after that devastating hur-
ricane to the private sector.195 Although the damage caused by Andrew 
was similar in scale to the damage in New Orleans, there is one sig-
niªcant difference between the two disasters—New Orleans cannot rely 
only on private solutions if it is to recover from Hurricane Katrina.196 
Though the private sector will be a necessary component in the recov-
ery effort, success will de dependent upon the involvement of the fed-
eral government.197
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1. The Hurricane Andrew Disaster 
 Prior to Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane Andrew was the most de-
structive hurricane in the United States on record.198 Andrew made 
landfall in Homestead, Florida on August 24, 1992 with wind readings 
establishing it as the third most powerful recorded hurricane to date.199 
Homestead, located thirty-eight miles south of Miami, suffered crip-
pling wind damage while the storm sideswiped the city of Miami it-
self.200 Andrew produced a seventeen foot storm surge near the landfall 
point in Homestead, caused twenty-three U.S. deaths, and resulted in 
$26.5 billion in damage in the United States.201 All but $1 billion of that 
damage was in south Florida and the vast majority of the damage in 
Florida was caused by winds.202
 Prior to Hurricane Andrew, Homestead was a city of about 26,000 
people in a mostly rural area.203 The local economy consisted of agri-
culture and a dying Air Force base, both of which were decimated by 
the hurricane.204 Migrant and permanent agricultural workers who 
lived in mobile homes were especially affected and many were left with 
nothing after Andrew.205
2. Federal and Local Responses to Hurricane Andrew 
 Residents of Homestead, Florida probably experienced déjà vu 
when they watched the lackluster federal response to Hurricane 
Katrina unfold on their television screens.206 On April 19, 1993, resi-
dents of that town gathered with Sen. Bob Graham at a hearing entitled 
Lessons Learned from Hurricane Andrew.207 The chief complaint was a lack 
of adequate federal response to the residents’ needs.208 Many Home-
stead residents were still trying to clear hurricane debris a year and a 
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half after the hurricane hit.209 In the absence of federal action, those 
affected by Andrew turned to the private sector, where a private non-
proªt organization stepped up to “lobby for government aid to gener-
ate, leverage and spend the outpouring of private contributions” that 
came in after the disaster.210
 The nonproªt organization, called We Will Rebuild, was founded 
by Alvah Chapman, the head of Knight-Ridder, a massive newspaper-
publishing company.211 In the ªrst week after the storm, Chapman 
called Bob Epling, the president of Community Bank in Homestead, 
and several other local businessmen to bring them together to take ac-
tion.212 Eventually, We Will Rebuild had a board of seventy-seven direc-
tors with specialized subcommittees devoted to issues like agriculture, 
health, the Air Force base, domestic violence, and communications 
with federal authorities.213 Chapman was chairman and Epling was one 
of two vice-chairmen.214
 We Will Rebuild combined private infrastructure and personnel 
with public funding to push the recovery efforts in Homestead for-
ward.215 Some ªnancial resources for the group came from private do-
nations, but nearly nine-tenths of the total funds the group allocated 
came from federal recovery dollars.216 Using this mostly federal fund-
ing, the nonproªt ªnanced professional recovery plans for twenty-eight 
neighborhoods.217 Committee heads from the private sector worked 
with local politicians to keep money and focus on south Florida.218
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 In Homestead, We Will Rebuild converted private donations, fed-
eral relief money, and beneªts from existing federal programs into new 
developments that would best serve the community in the future.219 
One We Will Rebuild project used a Department of Agriculture land-
use program that allowed the nonproªt to acquire a 108-acre land par-
cel adjacent to farm land.220 We Will Rebuild then united with the 
nonproªt Everglades Community Association, a group dedicated to 
building and improving farmworker housing.221 In the place of tempo-
rary migrant and poor farm worker housing destroyed by Andrew, the 
combined groups helped to build a permanent and appealing new 
community for the mostly Mexican-American farmworkers.222 The re-
sult was the Everglades Farmworker Villages, which consist of 443 at-
tractive apartments for nearly 4000 people connected to local agricul-
ture.223 In addition, the Villages boast 10,000 square feet of retail space 
and a ten-acre park.224 Today the residents of the Everglades Farm-
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ing and building new units on a steady but inadequate scale, seized the 
opportunity. 
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worker Villages have real homes with access to laundry, a day care cen-
ter, and a free clinic.225 At least one current resident said that while the 
new housing arrangement is “way different,” it is also “way better.”226 
The nonproªts united with the help of federal money and programs to 
create an innovative solution to a persistent problem in south Florida, 
with remarkably successful results.227
3. Lessons from Hurricane Andrew 
 The reconstruction of Homestead, Florida provides a real success 
story for private involvement in recovery efforts.228 We Will Rebuild 
utilized existing federal programs like the ones that the Bush Admini-
stration has funded to assist with Katrina recovery.229 While the in-
volvement of the private sector in Homestead and the rest of south 
Florida worked after Hurricane Andrew, there are some notable differ-
ences between the aftermath of Andrew versus the aftermath of Katrina 
that make reliance on a purely private solution untenable.230
 First, the damage wrought by Andrew was mostly caused by hurri-
cane-force winds as opposed to ºooding or storm surge.231 As a result, 
insurance companies that covered the area generally honored the re-
placement clause in homeowner insurance policies.232 Those owners 
who lost their homes to wind damage were able to recover a great deal 
of the value of their damaged homes.233 In New Orleans, where much 
of the damage was caused by ºooding, the ºood policies paid by the 
federal government do not contain the same replacement clauses.234 
Additionally, the payouts from the insurance companies after Andrew 
were “extremely generous,” according to a fellow at the International 
Hurricane Research Center.235 In all, after Andrew, approximately $20 
billion in insurance payouts went to “a very concentrated area.”236
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 After Andrew, the insurance industry instituted reforms that sought 
to limit their risk in a future disaster, in some cases speciªcally limiting 
reimbursement for ºood damage even if it was proximately caused by 
the covered hurricane winds.237 It remains to be seen whether the in-
surance industry’s reforms will stand up in court, but insurers do not 
appear eager to pay out on claims of ºood damage.238 Much of the 
money already allocated by the federal government for Katrina relief 
has been earmarked to reimburse homeowners who suffered losses but 
were not required to buy federal insurance policies because their homes 
were outside the ºoodplain.239 Those who lost homes to Andrew were 
more likely to be compensated by their insurance companies, thereby 
freeing up federal money for innovative projects like the Everglades 
Farmworker Villages.240
 If reintroduced, the Baker Bill’s additional funding and plan to 
implement cohesive development in the wake of destruction would 
have the potential to create innovative communities for low-income 
residents like the Everglades Farmworker Villages.241 Since insurance 
companies limited their risk on policies after the losses from Andrew 
and subsequent hurricanes, the federal government must step in with 
additional sources of funding if New Orleans has any hope of correct-
ing its glaring problems of inequality and affordability.242 Although the 
recovery of Homestead after Andrew was seen as a triumph for private 
investment, the money for the privately motivated projects overwhelm-
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ingly came from federal relief funds.243 Adequate federal funding is 
imperative as a catalyst to private action.244
 A second point of departure between the Andrew and Katrina dis-
asters is the number of political leaders whose constituents have a stake 
in recovery.245 We Will Rebuild received credit for bringing “unity and 
clarity” to Homestead’s recovery.246 Because the area hit by Andrew was 
about seventy-ªve percent unincorporated land, the number of local 
political districts affected was relatively small.247 One local leader in-
volved in the Andrew recovery remarked, “You could get all the politi-
cians affected into one room.”248 The lack of political involvement cre-
ated a void that the private sector ªlled after Andrew.249 We Will Rebuild 
shaped much of the recovery, running their group like a business whose 
goal was to take existing programs, then focus and supplement them.250
 In contrast, New Orleans has many local and state leaders vying for 
a piece of federal funding.251 Those political leaders represent parishes 
that have disparate needs and that vary widely in economic and racial 
makeup.252 While the Bush Administration’s effort to shore up existing 
programs is a good start, without some sort of organization designated 
to motivate cohesive rebuilding, any progress could become mired in 
political inªghting.253 The Baker Bill’s corporate-like, non-partisan 
structure would help sort out and prioritize the competing needs of the 
diverse communities of New Orleans.254
 Another signiªcant difference between south Florida and New Or-
leans is the population density in the areas hit by each storm and the 
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ensuing scale of damages.255 Andrew merely sideswiped Miami, while 
Katrina hit several heavily populated Gulf cities with full force.256 As a 
result, the damage to the primary city’s infrastructure was much more 
severe in Louisiana.257 After Andrew, most of Miami’s basic infrastruc-
ture survived the storm, which helped harder-hit outlying communities 
get back on their feet.258 In New Orleans, the failure of the levies and 
loss of many basic utilities has led many to rethink the layout of New 
Orleans entirely, with mayoral and state commissions proposing a more 
densely populated city in areas outside the federally designated ºood-
plain.259 Regardless of the approach eventually adopted, any rebuilding 
plan that seeks to improve the city of New Orleans will require a more 
ambitious federal strategy that involves more than simple tax incen-
tives.260
IV. A Pragmatic Approach to Poverty 
 In discussing the public and governmental response to Hurricane 
Katrina, Joseph Singer observed that Katrina “changed our national 
conversation,” focusing politicians and the media on issues of pov-
erty.261 Yet instead of thinking anew about poverty issues, Singer claims 
that Americans and the politicians who represented them expressed 
predictable responses immediately after the hurricane.262 Conservatives 
decried the big government bureaucracy that made New Orleans the 
mess it is and sought to ease the way for market forces.263 Liberals tried 
to argue that lack of government oversight and involvement was what 
caused the failure of the levees in the ªrst place.264
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 Singer argues that progressives need new rhetoric to “explain and 
justify their worldview.”265 Because the public demand for governmen-
tal response to the disaster has been nearly unanimous, liberals and 
conservatives need a way to discuss poverty in ways that do not place 
them at extremes of a government versus no government debate.266 
Singer says that after a disaster where everyone agrees government is 
necessary, relying on this type of discourse does not give elected 
ofªcials of either ideology the tools to support the types of taxation 
and regulation that both sides desire.267 Speciªcally, liberals need a 
way of expressing their goals of promoting equality and security by 
checking the excesses of the marketplace.268 Conservatives counter 
liberal ideas by playing to the fear of taxation and regulation.269 Lib-
erals need new language to express their ideas without reverting to 
couching them in conservative rhetoric.270
 If the “common view” after Katrina was that the government should 
do more to respond to poverty, Singer asks, how can the ideas of con-
servatives and liberals about the role of government be expressed to re-
ºect that?271 Singer abandons a conservative versus liberal, deregulation 
versus regulation formula in favor of an institutional versus pragmatic 
balance.272 The ideas associated more with conservatives are institution-
alist ideas.273 Singer says institutionalists want to create the right institu-
tions, consisting of limited government and laws that support a market 
economy, then let individuals operate freely within the world framed by 
those institutions.274 Thus, the regulations that are needed are rules that 
deªne property rights, enforce contracts, and punish those who cause 
unreasonable harm to others.275 If the proper institutions exist and eve-
ryone is given equal access, the institutionalist believes that every person 
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will have the ability to bring herself out of poverty.276 The result is that 
institutionalists accept that if poverty exists even after we create the 
“right” institutions, there is a certain level of poverty that will never go 
away.277 If individuals are uncomfortable with this resulting poverty base-
line, the appropriate way to address it is through private charity.278
 On the other hand, Singer describes the pragmatists as associated 
to some degree with liberal ideas of poverty.279 A pragmatist takes the 
view that the best institutions are ones that result in no poverty.280 
Pragmatists will not be satisªed until poverty is eradicated and will work 
to change the institutions to achieve that goal.281 Those who subscribe 
to pragmatism “are never done judging the acceptability of our institu-
tions,” and thus are more skeptical of the ability of the market to func-
tion in a way that will reduce poverty.282
 These two frameworks for addressing poverty both acknowledge 
heavy involvement from the federal government.283 Singer goes on to 
discuss how government regulation is the very thing that deªnes prop-
erty rights.284 Thus, how that government regulation is deployed has a 
serious impact on the resulting property regime.285 So far, the Bush 
Administration’s response has been to express conªdence in existing 
institutions.286 Money for immediate relief went to FEMA to be distrib-
uted to hurricane victims despite the failure of that body to respond 
properly in the aftermath of the storm.287 Billions of dollars were ear-
marked for business and development tax incentives in the Gulf Op-
portunity Zone without addressing some serious efªciency and utiliza-
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tion problems.288 Sadly, the smallest piece of federal appropriations 
went to CDBG grant funding, the federal program that actually has the 
most potential to impact the future of New Orleans’s residents.289 The 
federal reaction to Katrina did not take time to rethink the existing 
programs or consider bigger ideas for the future of New Orleans.290 
Instead, conservatives attacked the existing institutions as failures, took 
funding away from social welfare programs, and left nothing in the 
void.291 Perhaps the current administration’s institutionalist worldview 
leads it to believe that the existing institutions, or stripped-down ver-
sions of those institutions, are the best ones and that any resulting pov-
erty must be tolerated.292
 The Baker Bill was an innovative proposal because it had elements 
that satisfy both the institutionalist and the pragmatist.293 On the one 
hand, the Baker Bill’s structure used the free market to stimulate rede-
velopment.294 On the other hand, the Baker Bill dared to challenge the 
acceptability of existing institutions, in fact proposing a brand new in-
stitution to address the serious problems that lie ahead in rebuilding 
New Orleans.295 Most importantly, the Baker Bill’s redevelopment plan 
took into account the needs of the community and affordable hous-
ing.296 This is a truly pragmatic idea because it aims to improve low-
income communities to reduce poverty.297 The injustices exposed by 
Hurricane Katrina demonstrate that the pragmatic idea of a critical re-
evaluation of our existing institutions is needed more than ever.298
Conclusion 
 Hurricane Katrina dealt a crippling blow to the poor population of 
New Orleans. Abandoned in the Superdome and at the New Orleans 
Convention Center, American citizens were like refugees in their own 
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country. They sought asylum from a government that has continuously 
ignored their basic needs by slashing the budgets of federal-housing 
programs that help the neediest Americans. In response to New Or-
leans’s cries for help, President Bush approved a massive spending bill 
that would go primarily to corporations and short-term solutions, pass-
ing an insufªcient amount to local communities. 
 Though Rep. Baker offered a bold idea for reconstruction, it was 
ignored as an expansion of government bureaucracy. Baker’s vow to 
take his bill through the House and Senate failed the ªrst time, but his 
plan is worth a second look. The buyback program he proposed re-
sembles a similar, successful local buyback plan implemented on a 
smaller scale in Grand Forks, North Dakota after a massive ºood. Its 
corporate structure would both reduce political maneuvering for fed-
eral dollars and centralize decision-making power for more efªcient 
and successful future development. In addition, Baker’s idea attempted 
to recoup the federal dollars allocated to his idea, and to preserve the 
vital community input that decides which projects will work. Though 
the current administration believes that private investment will take on 
the task of rebuilding as We Will Rebuild did after Hurricane Andrew, 
there are unique challenges after Katrina. Infrastructure was destroyed 
in New Orleans. Insurance companies are reluctant to pay their share. 
More people are ªghting for a stake in the future of the city than they 
did in south Florida. 
 If the market is left to its own devices, is it entirely possible that 
New Orleans will be adequately rebuilt. But it is time to embrace a 
more pragmatic vision and attempt to rebuild New Orleans in an inno-
vative and forward-thinking way. To do this, the federal government 
needs to reintroduce and reconsider the Baker Bill, which would pro-
vide more federal funding to the area in a way that is not a handout, 
but an investment in a future without poverty. 
